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SIMPLE TRINITARIANISM AND  
FEATURE-PLACING SENTENCES
Shieva Kleinschmidt
Some Trinitarians, such as Thomas Aquinas, wish to claim that God is mereo-
logically simple; that is, God has no parts distinct from Himself. In this paper, 
I present Simple Trinitarianism, a view that takes God to be simple but, di-
verging from Aquinas, does not identify the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit with 
anything in our ontology. Nonetheless, Simple Trinitarians would like Trini-
tarian sentences to be true; thus, they must give a non-standard semantics for 
those sentences. I will focus on one possible semantics a Simple Trinitarian 
may give: taking Trinitarian claims to be translatable into feature-placing sen-
tences, which posit property instantiation without requiring commitment to 
any objects that instantiate those properties.
“The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God. However 
there are not three Gods, but one God.”1 Trinitarians believe that there are 
three distinct divine Persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Each 
of these is God and yet, exactly one God exists. But this appears to involve 
a contradiction: it seems the Trinitarian wants to claim three, distinct enti-
ties are each God, and yet only one entity is God.2
There have been a wide variety of responses to this puzzle. Some phi-
losophers take non-standard approaches to the identity relation,3 or posit 
some kind of sameness between the Persons and God that is not strict 
identity.4 Many (though not all) of the remaining responses fall into one of 
the following two groups. According to “One-Self” accounts,5 God has one 
center of consciousness, and plays distinct roles or has different aspects. 
The common charge against this kind of account is that it involves con-
1Athanasian Creed.
2As Dan Howard-Snyder points out, this puzzle has two readings: we could take “God” 
to be a count-noun (synonymous with “a god”), or as a name (Howard-Snyder, “Trinity”). 
I will generally treat “God” as a name, using “a God” to indicate when I wish to use it as a 
count-noun. But please substitute the count-noun reading as you prefer.
3See Martinich, “Identity and Trinity,” Cain, “The Doctrine of the Trinity,” and Klein-
schmidt, “Many-One Identity” for a sample. I will set aside such responses in this paper.
4See van Inwagen, “And Yet They Are Not Three Gods,” and Brower and Rea, “Material 
Constitution and the Trinity,” for example. I will also set aside responses like these in this 
paper.
5I am borrowing Dale Tuggy’s terminology and division here. See Tuggy, “Trinity.” 
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flating the Persons, or requires they are not divine. In contrast, according 
to Social Trinitarian accounts, there are three centers of consciousness. 
There are definitely three distinct Persons but, it is charged, either the 
Persons are not each God or there are multiple Gods. In this paper I will 
present Simple Trinitarianism, which attempts to find middle ground be-
tween One-Self Views and Social Trinitarianism. Some Trinitarians, such 
as Thomas Aquinas,6 wish to claim that God is mereologically simple; that 
is, God has no parts distinct from Himself.7 Simple Trinitarianism follows 
Aquinas in claiming that God is mereologically simple, and incorporates 
resources used in metaphysical debates about ontology to produce the 
right results for claims about the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Unlike with 
Aquinas’s view, Simple Trinitarianism does not attempt to find a place for 
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in our ontology (thus, they avoid mul-
tiplying gods, conflating Persons, or identifying the Persons with minor 
entities such as modes). The Simple Trinitarian uses semantics to explain 
how our ordinary sentences about the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are 
true.
A quick note on the aims of this paper. I will present what I take to 
be a new and interesting view of the Trinity. However, my goal is not to 
convince anyone to actually endorse this view: it is quite extreme, and the 
motivation for endorsing it is somewhat idiosyncratic. Instead, my central 
aim is to highlight the extent to which linguistics may be of use to us in 
addressing the puzzle of the Trinity. It is widely assumed that Trinitarian 
sentences are significantly ontologically restrictive. I hope to show that 
with an unusual semantics, we can give slightly less obvious (but often 
independently motivated) interpretations of these sentences which give 
us more ontological options than we expected.
I will proceed as follows. In §1, I will briefly present One-Self Views 
and Social Trinitarianism. I will then present a process we might use to 
develop theories (and which helps us better to compare them). Using this 
framework, I will present Simple Trinitarianism and show how it relates 
to One-Self Views and Social Trinitarianism. In §2, I will describe one 
option for a semantics that the Simple Trinitarian may give to produce 
the right results for our ordinary language statements about the Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit. I will not suggest that the Simple Trinitarian should 
endorse this semantics (rather than another that would produce similar 
results); instead, I intend to merely show that the Simple Trinitarian has 
the option of using this semantics to cash out his or her view. In §3, I will 
6Summa Contra Gentiles 4.1–26, and Summa Theologiae I.27–43. See Tuggy, “History of 
Trinitarian Doctrines” for more discussion of this view. It should be emphasized that Simple 
Trinitarians follow Aquinas in thinking God is mereologically simple. There may be other 
kinds of simplicity, and in particular, there may be simplicity with respect to properties 
exemplified. The Simple Trinitarian will not agree that God is simple in this way: God is 
predicatively complex, instantiating a wide variety of properties. This is exactly the sort of 
complexity in virtue of which Simple Trinitarianism bears some similarity to Social Trini-
tarianism.
7For a recent defense of the simplicity of God, see Brower, “Simplicity and Aseity.”
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discuss some questions about and (rather significant) objections to Simple 
Trinitarianism, including the question of how Simple Trinitarianism re-
lates to Brian Leftow’s version of Latin Trinitarianism, whether the Simple 
Trinitarian can say that God is a Person, and whether this view is really 
Trinitarian.
1. Simple Trinitarianism Introduced
Before presenting Simple Trinitarianism, I will briefly describe the two 
sorts of view it is intended to contrast with. I will not be surveying all 
views of the Trinity, or even all varieties of One-Self or Social Trinitarian 
views. And I will not be evaluating these views. Instead, I will simply give 
a brief look at a few examples of these views, in preparation for showing 
how Simple Trinitarianism relates to them.8
1.1. One-Self Accounts and Social Trinitarian Accounts
One-Self theorists tend to present God as one Person who plays three dis-
tinct roles, or has three distinct aspects. There are various ways to endorse 
such a view. For instance, we might identify each of the members of the 
Trinity with modes, or events, or the roles that God plays, or different as-
pects of God. (This will allow us to avoid saying that God is identical with 
each of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.) One may interpret Aquinas’s 
view of the Trinity this way. One may also read psychological models of 
the Trinity, such as that endorsed by St. Augustine, in this way: Aquinas 
says that we can find “images” of the Trinity in trinities in the human 
mind, with analogies to triplets such as memory, understanding, and will9 
(though these analogies are taken to be very rough guides10). Alternatively, 
Karl Barth11 and Karl Rahner12 have presented views on which the Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit are strictly identical to one another and to God. On 
this view, God stands in a wide variety of relations to Himself, such as 
begetting Himself, loving Himself, and so on. The Trinity is not a trinity of 
Persons (for those are each identical to God), but rather a trinity of modes 
of being, or roles that God plays. Regardless of whether we choose to 
identify the members of the Trinity with God or with other entities such as 
modes (or even with fusions of God and modes, events, properties, etc.), 
according to One-Self Views there is just one divine Person, though that 
Person may have many different ways of relating to His creation.13
8For a quite comprehensive overview of One-Self and Social Trinitarian views, see Tuggy, 
“Trinity.” For an in-depth discussion of five recent, prominent views of the Trinity, see 
Howard-Snyder, “Trinity.”
9Augustine, The Trinity, 374–382.
10Augustine, The Trinity, 428. For more discussion on this, see Tuggy, “History of Trini-
tarian Doctrines.”
11Barth, Church Dogmatics.
12Rahner, The Trinity.
13For more on this, see Tuggy, “Trinity.”
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Social Trinitarians tend to posit three distinct, divine centers of con-
sciousness, each of which is a Person. Richard Swinburne14 claims that 
each of the divine Persons can be said to be a God in the sense of pos-
sessing the divine attributes. When we say that there is one God, we mean 
that there is one divine community, but strictly speaking, God is actually 
a collection of three divine Persons rather than a singular entity. There is 
not merely one divine substance, and there are multiple bearers of divine 
attributes rather than just one. Moreland and Craig15 offer a picture of 
the Trinity in which they claim that God is a single substance with three 
centers of consciousness or Persons as parts.16 The Persons have many of 
the divine attributes, but no Person (identified with a center of conscious-
ness) is strictly identical to God. Again, “God” refers to a trinity of Persons 
(though the Persons share a single substance).
1.2. Theory Building
To explain the way in which Simple Trinitarianism attempts to find a 
middle ground between One-Self Views and Social Trinitarianism, it 
will help to first describe one way in which we might develop a theory 
of the Trinity. To do so, I will make a quick detour: I will describe a gen-
eral method of developing a theory and then will give an example from 
a debate in ontology. This example will not only help in explaining this 
method of theory-building, it will also provide background for some of 
the discussion in §2.1 of this paper. I will then return to show how this 
method applies in developing a view of the Trinity, and in particular, I will 
use it to explain the similarities and differences between Simple Trinitari-
anism and One-Self and Social Trinitarian views.
In developing a view of the world, we may take the following three 
steps. (1) Present a rough picture of what the world looks like. That is, 
without making technical claims about it, roughly describe how you think 
things are. (2) Give a technical theory that describes the picture you have 
presented; it should tell you which entities are present in the picture you 
presented, where identity relations are instantiated, and which other 
(perhaps controversial) properties and relations each of the entities and 
groups of entities instantiate. (3) Give a semantics that connects our ordi-
nary language sentences to the picture and the theory of it that you have 
described. Show how our ordinary sentences come out true, or explain the 
revisionary nature of your theory if you believe they come out false.
To give an example of going through these steps, consider the following 
views:
Monism: Exactly one material object exists.
14Swinburne, The Christian God.
15Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations.
16Some dispute the extent to which this picture is monotheistic, as it involves positing 
three distinct, divine Persons. See Howard-Snyder, “Trinity Monotheism.” Worries like this 
may be part of the Simple Trinitarian’s motivation for seeking an alternative view.
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Ontological Nihilism: No material objects exist.
Compositional Nihilism: No composite objects exist. That is, every object 
is mereologically simple: no object has any parts that are distinct from 
it.
The Standard View: More than one object exists, and some objects are 
composite.
There are multiple ways to endorse each of these views. For instance, 
suppose we complete step (1) by presenting a picture on which there seems 
to be just one, exceptionally tiny thing. This picture naturally suggests both 
Monism and Compositional Nihilism: in completing step (2), both can say 
that there is exactly one thing and, since that is the case, no composition 
occurs.17 However, this is a highly revisionary picture; according to it, the 
world is not at all how it appears to us to be. Monists and Compositional 
Nihilists needn’t endorse this kind of Revisionary Monism or Revisionary 
Compositional Nihilism. They could instead (and often do) complete step 
(1) by presenting a picture of the world that looks just like the picture pre-
sented by the proponent of the Standard View. On this picture, the world 
looks just as we tend to think it does; it is full, not empty. The difference 
between the views then becomes apparent with the completion of step (2). 
When we ask for theories describing the picture, identifying which bits of 
the world correspond to objects in their ontology, we will receive very dif-
ferent answers. The Monist will indicate exactly one thing, the whole thing 
all together, as the only object. This will be an extended simple: it fills an 
extended region, but it has no parts within that region that are distinct 
from it. Thus, the cosmos fails not only to have a left and right half, it also 
fails to have tiny particle-sized parts, person-parts, planet-parts, and so 
on. There is just one, large, mereologically simple object, which instan-
tiates some quite complicated properties. Ontological Nihilists will say 
there are no objects; they will try to explain what we think we see in some 
other way, perhaps via appeal to matter or to spacetime with interesting 
properties. When we ask Compositional Nihilists to describe this same 
picture, they will give a very different answer from Monists and Onto-
logical Nihilists. They will indicate (perhaps infinitely) many things, but 
none of those things will share parts, and none of them will make up other 
things. And when the proponents of the Standard View give their theory, 
they may posit the same objects Compositional Nihilists do, but they will 
also posit fusions of many of those objects. Finally, our theorists will need 
to complete step (3) to tell us how our ordinary language sentences, such 
as “The hat is on the table,” relate to the world. This is straightforward 
17Still, an Ontological Nihilist can also endorse this picture, claiming that instead of any 
material things there is merely instead some material stuff (or something along those lines). 
And a proponent of the Standard View can endorse the picture, claiming that multiple enti-
ties are colocated (though this would be farther from a common sense interpretation of the 
picture than such a theorist may want to accept).
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on the Standard View: we can simply claim that “the hat” and “the table” 
both refer to entities in our ontology, and the sentence is true if and only if 
one, the hat, stands in the proper relation to the other, the table. The propo-
nents of the more revisionary metaphysical views have some choices: they 
can deny that our ordinary sentences are true, or they can give a slightly 
more complicated semantics for them. For instance, the Monist may wish 
to take “the hat” to refer to a way The One object is, and the sentence “the 
hat is on the table” will count as true if and only if that property stands in 
the right relation to another property had by The One. The Compositional 
Nihilist, on the other hand, may say that when we talk of hats we’re re-
ally talking of “simples arranged hat-wise,” and say that the sentence is 
true just in case some group of such atoms are collectively on top of some 
group of atoms arranged chairwise. In §2 I will discuss one of the semantic 
options for theorists who accept revisionary metaphysical views, in order 
to show how the Simple Trinitarian may use the same semantic resources 
(without endorsing the same metaphysics).
1.3. Simple Trinitarianism
We can use this theory-building process in generating views of the Trinity 
as well. Suppose (taking very literally the instruction to “present a picture 
of how things are”) we ask a Trinitarian to draw God, using stick-figures. 
One-Self and Social Trinitarian theorists will disagree about which sort 
of picture of the world to endorse. One-Self theorists, at least of the sort 
I have described above, may present us with a picture of one stick-figure 
person holding many hats, symbolizing one “self” that has multiple roles 
it plays. Or they may present us with a duck/rabbit-esque picture. Social 
Trinitarians, on the other hand, may present us with a picture of three 
stick-figures, symbolizing three “selves.” There will be some theorists 
whose pictures won’t fall neatly into either of these categories; for in-
stance, Moreland and Craig’s picture may be of a single stick-figure with 
three heads. Brian Leftow, who uses a time-traveller as a model of the 
Trinity,18 would produce a picture that is technically of a single stick-figure 
that is thrice present. (This view will be further discussed in §3.2.) It is not 
important for our purposes here that every One-Self or Social Trinitarian 
view will produce one of the two pictures I’ve described, just that many 
of them will, and that there is a fundamental difference in how these theo-
rists think the world is (even before we’ve gotten to technical questions 
about which entities are divine, which are identical to which others, and 
so on).
Once we have these pictures, we can move on to step (2): we can ask 
our Trinitarian to circle the bits of the picture that correspond to entities in 
their domain, to say which of these objects are identical to which others, 
and to then say which of these objects is God, which objects are divine, 
which are Persons, etc. With this second step, two views (corresponding 
18See Leftow, “A Latin Trinity” and “Time Travel and the Trinity.”
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to the two different pictures) will be multiplied into many. For instance, 
some One-Self theorists with the first, one-stick-figure picture, will circle 
the stick-figure and also each of the hats, and then will indicate that the 
stick-figure is God. But then there are some options: she may identify the 
stick-figure with each of the members of the Trinity, or she may identify 
each member with one of the hats, or she may identify each member of the 
Trinity with a hat/stick-figure combination, etc. And the Social Trinitarian 
who adopts the picture with three stick-figures has a choice between 
saying that each stick-figure represents a God, or that the collection of the 
three stick-figures corresponds to the only God.
Simple Trinitarianism, as I am conceiving of it, involves opting for the 
second picture of the world: if you ask a Simple Trinitarian to draw God, 
they will give you a picture of three stick-figures. The Simple Trinitarian, 
in giving a rough picture of what the world looks like, will agree with 
the Social Trinitarian about the apparent complexity of God. This is what 
helps them, for instance, avoid saying that when the Father loves the Son, 
this just amounts to an instance of self-love. The Simple Trinitarian can 
agree with the Social Trinitarian that when the Father loves the Son, what’s 
happening is that one portion of reality stands in a particular relation to 
another portion of reality.19 However, the Simple Trinitarian will say that 
there are not individual entities corresponding to those different portions 
of reality. For step 2, when asked to circle the bits of the rough picture of 
God that correspond to entities in their domain, the Simple Trinitarian 
will draw only one circle, surrounding everything in their picture. The 
Simple Trinitarian may believe that there are other things that also exist, 
such as puppies and atoms and humans, but when it comes to God, there 
is exactly one entity. God will not have any distinct parts that make Him 
up. There will be no other candidates for divine entities, and certainly 
not multiple Gods. In this way, the Simple Trinitarian’s view bears some 
resemblance to One-Self Views. Simple Trinitarianism, then, is intended 
to capture both the complexity posited by Social Trinitarianism and the 
unity posited by One-Self Views. Importantly, though, unlike both Social 
Trinitarians and One-Self theorists, the Simple Trinitarian will not identify 
any of the objects in their picture (or in their domain) with the Father, the 
Son, or the Holy Spirit: taking God to be simple, the Simple Trinitarian 
cannot identify any of the members of the Trinity with distinct parts of 
God. And the Simple Trinitarian resists identifying the members of the 
Trinity with things even partly disjoint from God, such as events or prop-
erties (even though some of those things are importantly related to God). 
19Even if there are not distinct objects corresponding to the different portions of reality, 
the Simple Trinitarian can see a big difference between the Father loving the Son and the 
Father loving the Father. Consider the analogous case: suppose a Monist agrees with a Stan-
dard View Theorist about the rough picture of the world (i.e., how complex reality seems 
to be), though they disagree about how many objects there are. The Monist can still see a 
difference between a state of affairs of a father loving his daughter, and the father loving 
himself, even though there are not distinct objects corresponding to the father and daughter.
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Still, this Trinitarian wants our ordinary statements about the members of 
the Trinity to come out true. Thus, this revisionary ontology will require 
an unusual semantics.
2. Feature-Placing Sentences
In this section we will look at one option for how one might endorse a 
semantics that allows our ordinary language statements about the Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Spirit to come out true, while those entities are not 
present in our ontology. We want to be able to truly say “The Father begot 
the Son,” “The Father and the Son are distinct,” “The Son is God,” and 
“There is exactly one God.” We want to also be able to maintain the falsity 
of “The Son begot the Father” and “There are three Gods.” And we should 
keep in mind that the following semantics is just one of many available 
options; it is presented here in order to show that there is a way to cash out 
Simple Trinitarianism, though this is not the only way to do so.
2.1. Ontological Nihilism and Lack of Reference
Sometimes, sentences truly describe how the world is without having ref-
erential subject terms. For instance, consider these ever-popular examples:
1. “The average American adult male has 2.3 children.”
2. “It is raining.”20
In the first sentence, we are not talking about some entity, the average Amer-
ican adult male. And not only that, the noun-phrase “the average American 
adult male” does not refer to anything in our ontology; there is nothing in 
our ontology with exactly 2.3 children (thankfully!). Instead, the sentence 
has a logical structure that is quite unlike its surface structure. The sen-
tence tells us that the number of children with American fathers divided 
by the number of adult American males is 2.3.21 Still, in spite of having 
a non-obvious logical structure, the sentence is literally true. It is not 
expressing a metaphor or an approximation or something merely prag-
matically helpful or appropriate.
Similarly, in sentence (2), the subject-phrase “it” does not seem to refer 
to anything. When we assert the sentence, there is nothing of which we are 
attempting to say, “that is raining.”22 Instead, the sentence communicates 
the existence of an event of raining (or something along those lines) in 
some contextually salient location. Again, the logical form of the state-
ment is unlike the surface structure of the statement; it is not merely of 
the form Fx where x is the referent of “it” and F is the property is raining. 
Further, unlike sentence (1), the truth-conditions for sentence (2) arguably 
do not commit us to the existence of any material objects. In this way, the 
20Among other places, these examples are discussed in Hawthorne and Cortens, “To-
wards Ontological Nihilism.”
21Hawthorne and Cortens, “Towards Ontological Nihilism,” 155.
22Hawthorne and Cortens, “Towards Ontological Nihilism,” 146.
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sentence may be said to be “ontologically innocent.” Following Strawson, 
I will call such sentences “feature-placing sentences.”23
Recently, John Hawthorne and Andrew Cortens have examined how 
one might use such sentences as inspiration for a semantics that al-
lows Ontological Nihilists, who believe there are no material objects, to 
nonetheless claim we are speaking truly when we say “The hat is on the 
table.” Hawthorne and Cortens’s idea is this. First, Ontological Nihilist 
can build a language that includes only feature-placing sentences. So, for 
instance, in describing what looks like a white pebble, we may use our 
language to produce sentences such as “it is pebbling,” “it is pebbling 
whitely,” “it is presently pebbling here.” Second, Ontological Nihilists 
can develop a translation scheme for translating all of our true sentences 
in ordinary language into this ontologically innocent Nihilist language. 
Third, Ontological Nihilists will claim that their innocent language more 
perspicuously depicts reality, and that when we utter a sentence of ordi-
nary language such as “the hat is on the table,” the truth-conditions are 
exactly the truth-conditions of the corresponding sentence of our Nihilist 
language, “it is hatting directly above where it is tabling.”
One natural reaction to this semantics is this: though the subject-phrase 
“it” in the sentence “it is raining” does not refer to anything, the sentence 
does seem to be about something, namely, the world. The sentence says 
that the world has certain properties, such as including an instance of rain. 
That is: according to this response, feature-placing sentences are not quite 
as ontologically innocent as the Nihilist may have thought. Even when 
we think we’re merely talking about the existence of property instances, 
positing those commits us to the existence of something that instantiates 
those properties, such as the world. This reading of feature-placing sen-
tences will produce a Monist semantics rather than an Ontological Nihilist 
semantics. The Nihilist could disagree with this take on feature-placing 
sentences, but I will note that I find this picture a more intuitively plau-
sible interpretation of the sentences.
2.2. Application to the Trinity
Here is how we might apply Hawthorne and Cortens’s ideas to Simple 
Trinitarianism. The Simple Trinitarian wishes to describe the complex 
picture the Social Trinitarian accepts, but without being committed to 
the existence of the members of the Trinity. Thus, the Simple Trinitarian 
may offer a description of feature-placing language that can be used de-
scribe what God is like, and will then make general claims about how 
23Strawson, Individuals, further discussed in Quine, The Pursuit of Truth. It should be em-
phasized that Hawthorne and Cortens, “Towards Ontological Nihilism,” use this term more 
narrowly. They use it for sentences (such as, they argue, “it is raining”) that not only fail to 
commit us to the existence of any material objects, they fail to commit us to the existence of 
any material entities whatsoever (so, for instance, they also do not commit us to the existence 
of stuff, arguably a separate ontological category that is (typically) not picked out with count 
nouns).
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our ordinary-language sentences about the members of the Trinity can be 
translated into feature-placing sentences.
Here are some general rules they may give to apply to sentences about 
members of the Trinity (and importantly, they may endorse this seman-
tics for sentences including the noun-phrases “the Father,” “the Son,” 
and “the Holy Spirit” while rejecting them the corresponding rules for all 
other sentences). Note that for relational sentences, our theorist may opt 
to translate all relations into predicates.24
□ Any sentence with the surface form “x is F” corresponds to a fea-
ture-placing sentence of the form “it is x-ing F-ly.”
□ Any sentence with the surface form “xRy” corresponds to a sen-
tence of the form “it is xing R-y-ly” or “it is xing y-Ring-ly.”
For instance, “the table is taller than the ant” may be translated as “it is 
tabling taller-than-the-ant-ly,” and “the table squashed the ant” may be 
translated as “it tabled ant-squashingly.” In cases where we think the 
object of such a sentence also, strictly speaking, does not exist, we may 
further translate the sentence:
□ Sentences of the form “it is xing R-y-ly” or “it is xing y-Ring-ly” may 
correspond to feature-placing sentences of the form “it is xing R-its-
ying-ly.”25
Rules for universal and existential quantification translations can also be 
given. Finally, the Simple Trinitarian will note that (a) these rules may be 
taken to only apply in sentences about members of the Trinity, and (b) the 
term “God” will typically be treated as an ordinary referential term and 
will not require translation.
So, for instance, here are some things we would like to assert about 
members of the Trinity:
3. The Father is uncreated.
4. The Father created the world.
5. The Father begot the Son.
6. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.
7. There is one Holy Spirit, not three Holy Spirits.
Here is how the Simple Trinitarian, utilizing a Hawthorne/Cortens seman-
tics, might translate the above sentences:
24Hawthorne and Cortens, in “Towards Ontological Nihilism,” do not discuss how to 
extend their theory to relational sentences, but for more on the alternatives available and 
difficulties facing such extensions, see Hawthorne and Sider, “Locations,” and Turner, “On-
tological Nihilism.”
25The details of such translations would also include information about when to add or 
substitute certain suffixes. For instance, the change between “x loves y” and its translation 
“it is xing loving-of-its-ying-ly.”
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8. It Fathered uncreatedly.
9. It Fathered world-creatingly. (Or perhaps: it Fathered creating-of-
the-world-ly.)
10. It Fathered Its-Sonning-begottenly. (Or perhaps: It Fathered begot-
ting-of-Its-Sonning-ly.)
11. It Holy-Spirited From-Its-Fathering-and-Its-Sonning-Proceedingly. 
(Or perhaps: it Holy-Spirited Proceedingly from Its Fathering and 
Its Sonning.)
12. It Holy-Spirited exactly once.
With a translation scheme from ordinary language into less ontologi-
cally-committing language, the Simple Trinitarian is able to assert all of 
the ordinary claims of the Trinity but avoid many of the negative conse-
quences faced by other theorists. And it is on the basis of this ability to 
avoid these negative consequences that the Simple Trinitarian will argue 
not just that a translation-scheme like this one exists, but that we should 
take the less ontologically-committing sentences to more perspicuously 
describe the world than statements expressed in ordinary language.
It’s worth noting that the Simple Trinitarian is not as restricted as the 
Ontological Nihilist in her interpretation of Trinity-involving feature-
placing sentences. The Ontological Nihilist needs to take such sentences 
to be ontologically innocent, but the Simple Trinitarian loses nothing if 
the truth of these sentences requires the existence of something. It is also 
not problematic if “it” in these sentences refers. All the Simple Trinitarian 
must avoid is commitment to any members of the Trinity, or to any dis-
tinct parts of God. Thus, the Simple Trinitarian is free to say that, just as 
“it is raining” tells us what the world is like, (8) tells us something about 
God. When asking what the sentence is about, the correct response is: it is 
about God. And, for the Simple Trinitarian’s purposes, it is permissible to 
take “it” in each of (8)–(12) to refer to God. (It is God that has the property 
of Fathering uncreatedly, for instance.) Simple Trinitarians simply need 
that “The Father,” “The Son,” and “The Holy Spirit” in ordinary language 
sentences such as (8)–(12) do not refer. Thus, the Simple Trinitarian has 
more options than the Ontological Nihilist. But the semantics presented 
by Hawthorne and Cortens gives us a helpful guide for how a Simple 
Trinitarian semantics may go.
Interestingly, we may also wish to endorse Hawthorne and Cortens’s 
view about existential claims in ordinary language. When discussing 
how the Ontological Nihilist should treat the claim “pebbles exist,” they 
pointed out that one option is for the Ontological Nihilist to say that the 
sentence is literally true, but that its truth-conditions don’t actually involve 
the existence of any material objects (instead, the sentence is translated 
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into the more perspicuous “it is pebbling at least once”).26 Similarly, the 
Simple Trinitarian can endorse this sentence in ordinary language:
13. The Father exists.
The Simple Trinitarian does not actually have anything in his or her on-
tology corresponding to The Father, but (13) is true in virtue of having the 
same truth-conditions as:
14. It Fathers. (Or perhaps: Its Fathering exists.)
Again, importantly, the Simple Trinitarian does not take “The Father” to 
refer to Its Fathering or even just Fathering, just as the Ontological Nihilist 
will not identify pebbles with pebbling. If such identifications were made, 
we would be committed to a host of additional claims, such as: the Father 
is a property, and pebbles are properties. We do not want to make such 
commitments, and nothing forces us to do so.
One final note in my presentation of this semantics. It allows us to 
truly say the sentence “there are two pebbles in my shoe” without, strictly 
speaking, there actually being two material objects, pebbles, in our on-
tology, but such a semantics does not thereby let us use ordinary language 
to assert the existence of anything we choose. We cannot, for instance, 
truly say “there are a thousand pebbles in my shoe.” This is because the 
truth-conditions of the sentence, though they don’t actually require the 
presence of such objects in our ontology, are still tightly connected to the 
way the world is. The world does not instantiate the right properties to 
ground the truth of “there are a thousand pebbles in my shoe.” Similarly, 
though we can truly say “the Father created the world,” even if there is 
nothing in our ontology that is the referent of “the Father,” our semantics 
does not give us a free pass to then say “twelve Fathers created the world,” 
because God does not instantiate the properties required to ground the 
truth of that sentence.
2.3. Two Worries For This Semantics
I have two concerns about this use of feature-placing sentences for Simple 
Trinitarianism. The first is a worry about anaphoric predication, the second 
is a worry about counting. I believe that both worries can be addressed, 
but I wish to highlight that more work needs to be done here.
Consider the following sentence:
15. I am in the room, and so is this puppy, Chompy.
Sentence (15) includes an instance of anaphoric predication; the same predi-
cate is applied to two noun-phrases (here, across two inflectional phrases). 
The sentence says the property being in the room applies to me, and that 
the same property also applies to Chompy. Sentences involving anaphoric 
26Hawthorne and Cortens, “Towards Ontological Nihilism,” 156.
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predication may cause problems for our Simple Trinitarian’s use of fea-
ture-placing semantics. Consider this sentence:
16. The Holy Spirit is in the room.
According to our feature-placing semantics, (16) corresponds to:
17. It is Holy-Spiriting in-the-roomly.
But now consider this sentence that seems to involve anaphoric predica-
tion:
18. The Holy Spirit is in the room, and so am I.
Suppose, for instance, that I assert (18) in an attempt to communicate my 
close proximity to the Holy Spirit. This seems like a reasonable, assertable 
sentence. And though there are some sentences that look like they have 
anaphoric structure but do not actually involve anaphoric predication, 
such as “the sky is blue, and so is her mood,” this sentence doesn’t strike 
us as involving any sort of ambiguity in the predicate.
Here’s the problem: if we understand the truth of (16) as requiring 
merely the instantiation of a quite complicated property, Holy-Spiriting-
in-the-roomly, then it does not seem that there is a property that the first 
conjunct of (18) predicates which can also be applied to me. And this 
seems to be the wrong result: if we can truly say the Holy Spirit can be 
present at all, it seems we should be able to truly say the Holy Spirit can 
be present in the same room with me.
There are two appealing options for responding to this. First, you might 
simply agree that any Trinitarian sentences involving anaphoric predica-
tion will be false. Far from being a problem, you might take this to be 
a good result. You may endorse the Aquinas’s Doctrine of Analogical 
Predication,27 according to which, roughly, we cannot share properties 
with God. When the Holy Spirit does something, it is done divinely, and in 
a way at best merely analogous to how I or any other nondivine entity can 
do it. We shouldn’t expect to be able to share properties with the Persons, 
and the fact that this falls out of our semantics is a good feature of that 
semantics. There are two quick things to note about this response, though: 
(a) insofar as a feature-placing semantics for the Persons of the Trinity 
entails something like analogical predication for the Persons of the Trinity 
and non-divine entities, it will also entail that anaphoric predication fails 
for sentences about multiple members of the Trinity. That is, just as we 
cannot say “The Holy Spirit is in the room, and so is Shieva” and take that 
to involve a single property being picked out by a predicate applied both 
to “Shieva” and “the Holy Spirit,” we cannot say that “The Holy Spirit is 
in the room, and so is the Son” and take that to involve a single property 
being picked out by a predicate applied to both “the Holy Spirit” and “the 
27See, for instance, Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles I. For an excellent recent discussion 
of this, see Bonevac, “Two Theories of Analogical Predication.”
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Son.” The second thing to note is that, because the Trinitarian feature-
placing semantics allows for “God” to refer to an entity in our domain, the 
semantics does not block anaphoric sentences such as “God is in the room, 
and so am I,” and so the doctrine of analogical predication with respect to 
God does not follow as a result of our semantics, though the doctrine with 
respect to the Persons of the Trinity does.
Suppose, instead, that you think at least some sentences like (18) can 
be true. Some work will need to be done in showing how. One strategy 
is to claim that (16) does not simply require the instantiation of one quite 
complex property, but instead requires the instantiation of two properties: 
Holy-Spiriting, and being in-the-room. For this strategy to work, it will be 
important that the predicate in-the-room can apply to both individuals and 
properties. There may be other, better responses to this problem, but it 
seems that some solution will be available, though work will need to be 
done to show how it goes.
There is a second, much more serious worry about using feature-placing 
semantics for Simple Trinitarianism. The worry is that we will be able to 
truly assert that there are three gods. Here is why. Consider the sentence:
19. Maegan is a philosopher and Renee is a philosopher.
In feature-placing language, this will translate to:
20. It is Maeganing philosopher-ly and it is Reneeing philosopher-ly.
From this, we would like to be able to conclude:
21. It is philosopher-ing twice.
And this should correspond to the ordinary English sentence:
22. There are at least two philosophers.
Similarly, for this Trinitarian sentence:
23. The Father is a Person, and the Son is a Person.
The corresponding feature-placing sentence will be:
24. It is Fathering Person-ly, and it is Sonning Person-ly.
And we would like to conclude from this that:
25. It is Person-ing twice.
And this corresponds to the ordinary English sentence:
26. There are at least two Persons.
These are inferences we are glad to be able to make. But now consider the 
following sentence and its feature-placing translation:
27. The Father is a god, and the Son is a god.
28. It is Fathering god-ly and it is Sonning god-ly.
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From this, we’d like to conclude:
29. It is god-ing twice.
And it looks like this will correspond to the ordinary English sentence:
30. There are at least two gods.
This is a big problem, especially because part of the Simple Trinitarian’s 
motivation for their restricted ontology may well be an attempt to avoid 
multiple divine entities, in an effort to avoid multiple gods.
In order to avoid this result, it looks like Simple Trinitarians will have to 
attempt to block every one of these sorts of inferences. For instance, they 
may attempt to block the inference from (20) to (21), and (24) to (25). That 
is, for instance, they would block the inference from its Sonning Person-ly 
to its Person-ing at least once. They’ll block the inference from a sentence 
merely involving a feature-placing predicate to a sentence containing 
count language. Alternatively, our theorists may attempt to block the 
reading of (21) as (22) or the understanding of (25) as (26); that is, they 
may agree that we can conclude sentences like “it is Person-ing twice,” but 
deny that such a sentence corresponds to ordinary sentence “There are at 
least two Persons.” I am inclined to think the first of these two responses 
is the most promising, and that attempting to block these count-involving 
inferences is, while costly, a much better option for the Simple Trinitarian 
than accepting that there’s a true sense of “there are three gods.” But a lot 
of work needs to be done here.
Finally, one last response is for the Simple Trinitarian to simply opt for 
an alternative semantics. There are many other options for how a Simple 
Trinitarian semantics could go, and some of them will not face these wor-
ries.28 Still, this semantics gets many of the results we want, and there are 
things that can be said in response to the worries facing it.
3. Questions, Objections, and Replies
To conclude my presentation of Simple Trinitarianism, I will consider 
some questions and objections about the view. However, before jumping 
into describing its vices, let us take a moment to look once again at the 
view’s virtues.
Simple Trinitarianism is intended to allow for both community and 
unity: it is intended to allow for the complexity of the Social Trinitarian 
picture of the community of Persons (a complexity captured in the Simple 
Trinitarian picture by a wide array of events and states of affairs), but to 
also put an emphasis on the unity of God by taking Him to be completely 
indivisible. The view avoids objections about dividing the substance, and 
it allows us to avoid any suggestion that there are multiple Gods; for the 
28For application of another semantics to Simple Trinitarianism, see Kleinschmidt, 
“Simple Trinitarianism and Empty Names.” For another very relevant view, see Horgan and 
Potrč, “Blobjectivism.”
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Simple Trinitarian, there is only one entity that exemplifies the divine at-
tributes. And Simple Trinitarianism also allows us to avoid conflating the 
Persons or identifying them with minor entities such as events or prop-
erties.29 And it allows us to say almost everything we want to about the 
members of the Trinity (and we have multiple options for how we may 
take the semantic component of the view to go).
However, there are some significant worries about the view. I will begin 
with one matter of clarification, and then discuss two difficulties for the 
view.
3.1. How Does Simple Trinitarianism Relate To Leftow’s Latin Trinitarianism?
Brian Leftow has presented a version of Latin Trinitarianism on which 
God is, in some sense, multiply wholly present. Leftow presents as a rough 
analogy a story about a time-travelling Rockette who comes to occupy 
every position in a chorus line made up entirely of her; there is exactly 
one Rockette on the stage, but there seem to be many, and they can differ 
in their properties.30 Though we may deny that God is ever located in time 
or space, we can claim that there is some sense in which God, like the 
Rockette, can be multiply present without this involving a multiplication 
of objects.
There are some important ways in which Simple Trinitarianism and 
Leftow’s Latin Trinitarianism are similar. The Simple Trinitarianism has 
the option of claiming that God is simple but is somehow multiply wholly 
present. Leftow’s view gives us a nice way to explain how God can be 
complex while our number of entities remains restricted.
However, there are also some crucial differences between Simple Trini-
tarianism and Leftow’s Latin Trinitarianism. For instance, Leftow’s view 
does not commit him to the simplicity of God; unlike the Simple Trini-
tarian, Leftow is free to say that in the incarnation God had hands that 
broke bread and feet that were washed. An even more crucial difference 
between the views is that Leftow has a place in his ontology for the mem-
bers of the Trinity. He does not deny the existence of the Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit. This is one source of objections to Leftow’s view: once we have 
the Persons in our ontology, we are pressed to deny their divinity, conflate 
them, or endorse the existence of multiple Gods. In the case of Leftow’s 
view, worries have been raised that multilocation leads to conflation of the 
persons: the point of multilocation is that you have one-and-the-same entity 
at distinct regions. Saying that God is multilocated, and that at one region 
God is the Son and at another He is the Holy Spirit, seems to require ei-
ther region-relative identity or the strict identity of the Son with the Holy 
29Identifying the Persons with modes or events seems particularly worrying if you believe 
God does not have modes or events as parts. For then, not only are the Persons not identical 
to God, they are partly mereologically independent of God! They each include something 
that God does not. This may be a secondary objection, of course; the primary objection is 
likely to be that we simply don’t want to claim that Jesus was an event or a property.
30See Leftow, “A Latin Trinity.”
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Spirit.31 Simple Trinitarianism avoids this problem, though of course, with 
other costs.
3.2. Can a Simple Trinitarian Say God Is a Person?
The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are excellent candidates for being 
Persons.32 For instance, they have complex mental states and seem to be 
morally responsible for their actions. However, the Simple Trinitarian 
cannot say that, strictly speaking, there is a Person who is identical with 
the Father (or if they do say this, they must also note that this is not the 
most perspicuous way to describe the world). If we cannot appeal to the 
members of the Trinity as divine Persons, can we say there are any divine 
Persons at all?
Of course, what the Simple Trinitarian will want to claim is that God is 
a divine Person. But if God is a simple entity consisting of what looks like 
a community of three Persons (though without there being any objects 
corresponding to those Persons), establishing that God has the right fea-
tures for Personhood is non-trivial.
The Simple Trinitarian’s response can come in two parts: first, they can 
try to establish that God has many of the requisite properties for person-
hood; and second, they can claim that God, having these properties, is the 
best candidate in the vicinity for being a person.
One difficulty for establishing that God has person-like properties is 
this: the Simple Trinitarian picture of God is just like the Social Trinitar-
ian’s. It involves positing three centers of consciousness (or something 
along those lines; and of course, the Simple Trinitarian will not agree 
that there are literally distinct objects that are centers of consciousness 
and which are parts of God). One may worry about how something with 
three centers of consciousness can be said to be a Person: how can it act, 
believe, and love? There are two options for response here. The first is to 
follow Trenton Merricks in thinking that it is not completely unheard-of 
for multiple centers of consciousness to be had by a single person.33 Mer-
ricks has us consider a person with a “split brain,” where the hemispheres 
of the brain have limited ability to communicate and so, it seems, there are 
multiple centers of consciousness. Merricks argues that when someone 
undergoes an operation that causes them to come to have a split brain, 
31For more on this objection see Hasker, “A Leftovian Trinity?” and Leftow’s reply, “Time 
Travel and the Trinity.”
32Of course, there is disagreement about how we should interpret the word “Person” in 
the context of the Trinity. For instance, David Brown claims that at the time the Athanasian 
Creed was written, “Person” meant simply something like the bearer of a referent, rather than a 
“self-reflective and self-determining center of consciousness” (Brown, “Trinity,” 526). On this 
less demanding reading of “Person,” it is easy for the Simple Trinitarian to claim the Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit are Persons. However, it common to take the members of the Trinity, or 
at least God, to be a Person in a stronger sense. It is that objection that I am hoping to address. 
For more on debates about use of the word “Person,” see also Barth, Church Dogmatics and 
Rahner, The Trinity.
33Merricks, “Split Brains and the Godhead.”
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there is exactly one person who emerges from the operation, namely, the 
same person who underwent it. I will not argue for or against this view 
here. It is simply worth noting that, if you agree with Merricks about split 
brain cases, but you are also motivated to claim that God is mereologi-
cally simple, you might opt for Simple Trinitarianism and find no problem 
with saying that God is a person with (something along the lines of) three 
centers of consciousness.
Consider now a Simple Trinitarian who does not agree with Merricks. 
They may still claim that their simple God is a person by giving an account 
inspired by Swinburne.34 Their first step will be to argue that a group of 
divine entities itself can have the divine attributes. Just as we may claim 
that, when a group of three people each knows a fact, the group knows 
the fact, we may be able to claim that a group or team of three omniscient 
persons knows everything, in virtue of each of its members having this 
feature. (We can make similar claims for omnipotence and omnibenevo-
lence.) Further, as Swinburne notes, there seem to be close connections 
between the states of the members of the Trinity; they jointly cause, jointly 
will, and necessarily co-exist. All of this can be appealed to in attempting 
to establish a unity that makes more plausible the claim that God itself 
has the properties of causing and willing. Second, it is very plausible that 
if something has the divine attributes, then some person does. But on the 
Simple Trinitarian picture, the only person in the vicinity is God. Unlike 
the Social Trinitarian, the Simple Trinitarian does not believe that God has 
any proper parts that are also divine. So, if there is to be a person who 
caused the world’s existence, who knows everything, and who sometimes 
answers our prayers, this person must be God.
I am not satisfied with this response, however. To see why, consider a 
strange view: suppose someone believed that whenever two people got 
married, those people went out of existence and the fusion of those people 
was the only object left in the vicinity. Suppose one such married “couple” 
is named “Brangelina.”35 Our theorist might say: “Some person in the vi-
cinity of Brangelina raises children, interacts with the press, and so on. 
But there is no person, Brad or Angelina. Instead, the only candidate in the 
vicinity for being a person is Brangelina. So, we should take Brangelina to 
be a person.” This is clearly a terrible argument. The correct response to 
the argument is to either reject the strange view about what happens with 
marriage, or to deny that, given that view’s truth, there is some person in 
the vicinity of Brangelina.
Likewise, I think that it may be better for the Simple Trinitarian to bite 
the bullet and agree that there are no divine People. The Simple Trini-
34Swinburne, The Christian God.
35It is my understanding that this term is used to refer to Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie. 
Note that if there is not a fusion of Pitt and Jolie, and if the name is taken to refer to a material 
object (rather than a collection, set, plurality, group, or other such entity), then this will be an 
example of an empty name that is often used in true sentences, and which, unlike fictional 
entities, is closely tied to how the world is.
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tarian can still claim that God is Divine, but they will accept that there is 
not a single center of agency or of moral responsibility. Still, they will say, 
when speaking in ordinary language we can truly claim that The Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Spirit are Divine Persons. And, they may also note, 
insofar as anyone ever becomes tempted to allow Social Trinitarians to 
think the Trinitarian community is itself a person, they should take the 
Simple Trinitarian God to be a person as well.
3.3. How Can This Possibly Be Trinitarian?
As we saw in §2.1 and §2.2, we are not guaranteed to be able to adequately 
capture all of the statements about the Trinity (such as the claim that “the 
Son is God”), and most crucially, even if we can have a true sense of the 
sentence “the Son exists,” there will also be a sense in which that sentence 
is either false or it fails to perspicuously describe reality. But if anything 
is central to Trinitarianism, it seems the existence of the members of the 
Trinity would be!
The Simple Trinitarian will reject this claim. They will say that what is 
essential to Trinitarianism is a certain picture of the world, on which God 
has a certain degree of complexity, and God relates to us and to the world 
in particular (and quite varied) ways. And Simple Trinitarianism does 
capture this picture. The additional claim, that there really are objects cor-
responding to what we call “the Father,” “the Son,” and “the Holy Spirit,” 
rather than just portions of reality with the right properties, is not a crucial 
component of Trinitarianism.
However, I believe that Simple Trinitarianism is revisionary enough 
that it is not a good option for everyone. For many theorists, there are 
easier alternatives for solving the problem of the Trinity. Simple Trinitari-
anism is presented here as a promising option for four kinds of theorist: (i) 
someone who already wishes to claim that God is mereologically simple 
but wishes to retain as much of Trinitarianism as they can, (ii) One-Self 
theorists who is wary of identifying the Persons with entities such as prop-
erties or events, (iii) Social Trinitarians who are worried that positing three 
bearers of the divine attributes commits them to the existence of three 
gods, and (iv) Trinitarians who already accept restrictive ontologies in 
other domains, such as those who accept Monism, Ontological Nihilism, 
or Compositional Nihilism (for such a theorist, if they wish to allow for 
our ordinary sentences about material objects to often be true, will already 
endorse a semantics that can help us in translating the claims about the 
Trinity). For theorists such as these, there is motivation for adopting this 
unusual view, and it is less revisionary than we would have suspected.36
University of Southern California
36Thanks to Andrew Bacon, Andrew Cortens, Dan Howard-Snyder, Dan Korman, 
Bradley Rettler, and Jeff Russell for helpful discussion about this topic. I am very grateful 
to Mark Murphy and three referees for their exceptionally helpful comments. And thanks to 
the wonderful audience at the March 2016 conference on the Metaphysics of the Trinity at 
Oxford University.
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